Could Russia be losing its hard-won post-Cold-War status as a great power? As the bad news for Vladimir Putin piles up, the question of Russian decline—and its implications for world geopolitics—is coming into focus.
Russian President Vladimir Putin listens to Russia’s Commissioner for Human Rights Yana Lantratova at the Kremlin in Moscow, Monday, June 29, (AP)
Recent weeks have been nightmarish for the Russian leader. Kyiv’s drone strikes deep into Russian territory have disrupted the lives of millions of Russians who had been told they were winning a war against a weak and ineffectual Ukraine. The unrelenting pace of military casualties continues to bleed Russia’s declining population without significant battlefield advances. As blackouts and fuel shortages hobble Russian-occupied Crimea—where desperate tourists and residents are struggling to escape the hard-hit peninsula via war-damaged routes—Mr. Putin faces his greatest political challenge since Boris Yeltsin handed him the keys to the Kremlin in 1999.
The news on the battlefront and in the air war is bad enough for the Kremlin; the big picture looks even worse. From a military point of view, the most salient aspect is the failure of Russian power in and around the Black Sea. In 2022, Russia’s armed forces failed to capture the economically and strategically vital port of Odesa. Things have deteriorated ever since. Ukraine lacks a powerful navy, but missile strikes as well as drone attacks by air and sea have forced Russia’s Black Sea fleet out of Sevastopol in occupied Crimea and neutralized Russian sea power.
Russia has largely dominated the Black Sea since the 18th-century reign of Catherine the Great. Securing that dominance lies at the heart of the imperial vision that drives Mr. Putin and his nationalist supporters. But Russian power in and around this vital waterway is significantly weaker than it was in 2022, and the outlook for gains is currently bleak.
The longer the war goes on, the more Russian power in other former Soviet republics diminishes. The situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia is moving against Russia. The U.S., China and Turkey are all developing economic and even military links that threaten Russia’s hopes for control in territories first conquered by the czars. At the same time, the shifting balance of power is making itself felt in Belarus, where President Alexander Lukashenko is worried enough about Ukraine’s threats that he is resisting pressure from Mr. Putin to use his territory to assist Russia’s war.
Finally, Russia’s energy problems go well beyond the fuel shortages caused by recent Ukrainian drone attacks. The Middle East crisis, which only recently seemed to be throwing Mr. Putin a lifeline by spiking energy prices, has eased. If Iran and the U.S. reach agreements that allow substantial amounts of Iranian oil back onto world markets, Mr. Putin will face collapsing oil revenue. Ukrainian attacks on refineries and other facilities are curtailing Russia’s ability to export. Put falling prices together with reduced output, and Russia faces some grim downshifts in government revenue—even as the war demands every ruble Mr. Putin can find. In the longer term, the likelihood of increased production in places like Venezuela and Argentina even as China cuts back on imports suggests lower prices. Progress toward a route for Central Asian oil and gas that avoids Russian territory further lessens Russia’s power over world energy markets.
It is too early to write off Mr. Putin or the country he leads. Russian scientists may find effective counters to Ukraine’s current technological advantages. And while the Russian ruler has never been much of a military strategist, he has pulled off more than one unlikely diplomatic win—and he continues to seek ways in which Russian assets like its nuclear arsenal and its capabilities in cyber, hybrid and information war could tilt the balance back in Moscow’s favor.
But the laws of historical gravity ultimately make themselves felt. Russia’s declining population, the failure of its tech industry to reach world-class levels, its broader economic failures since the end of the Cold War, the rise of China to the east, and the continuing force of nationalism in the ex-Soviet republics from Kyrgyzstan to Ukraine all weaken Russia’s position in the world.
Russia won’t disappear, but Moscow’s descent into the ranks of middle powers looks ever more likely. A world in which Russia no longer has much ability to threaten its neighbors would be a different place. The momentum for European rearmament would likely disappear. A China tempted by Russian weakness might seek the return of territories lost to the czars even as it looked to draw the Central Asian republics further into its embrace. Freed from its worries about Russian power, Turkey would look to expand its economic and political power in the Balkans and the Middle East.
Mr. Putin hoped to revive Russia as a superpower. His successors, it seems increasingly likely, may have to content themselves with less ambitious goals.
