The future of US-Saudi Arabia relations may hinge less on grand declarations than on Washington’s ability to distinguish between strategic interests and political aspirations.
If the United States conditions a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia on the kingdom’s immediate accession to the Abraham Accords, it would be collapsing two fundamentally different policy objectives into a single diplomatic test.
Such an approach may appear to increase American leverage. In practice, it is more likely to diminish US influence while accelerating the emergence of a more multipolar Middle East.
The issue is not whether normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel would serve regional interests. There are persuasive arguments that it eventually could. Rather, the question is whether Washington can realistically expect Riyadh to abandon a position it has articulated with remarkable consistency for more than two decades: that formal normalisation must follow – not precede – a credible pathway towards Palestinian statehood.
Saudi Arabia’s position has often been misunderstood as a bargaining tactic. It is better understood as a strategic doctrine.
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The kingdom remains the principal sponsor of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, which offered Israel comprehensive normalisation in exchange for withdrawal from occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Since the outbreak of the Gaza war, Saudi officials have reiterated that this framework remains the basis of their policy. The consistency of these statements suggests they are enduring strategic commitments, not temporary negotiating positions.
Ignoring this reality risks misunderstanding the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Over the past decade, Riyadh has demonstrated an unprecedented willingness to redefine its economic model, diversify its international partnerships and pursue regional de-escalation.
It has restored diplomatic relations with Iran and expanded engagement with China and India. At home, it has pursued an ambitious transformation through Vision 2030.
Yet this pragmatism has not translated into flexibility on the Palestinian question. On the contrary, Saudi leaders appear to view support for Palestinian statehood as an essential component of both regional legitimacy and domestic political credibility.
Limits of US leverage
From Washington’s perspective, a civilian nuclear agreement serves strategic purposes that extend well beyond bilateral relations.
Such an agreement would institutionalise long-standing technological cooperation, strengthen non-proliferation safeguards and reinforce American influence over the development of Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear infrastructure.
The question facing Washington is not whether Saudi Arabia will pursue nuclear development but how central a role the US will play in shaping that process
These objectives have intrinsic value irrespective of the pace of Arab-Israeli normalisation.
Indeed, the strategic costs of abandoning such cooperation may prove greater than many policymakers assume. Saudi Arabia’s interest in developing civilian nuclear capabilities is unlikely to disappear because negotiations with Washington stall.
The more probable outcome is that Riyadh will diversify its partnerships, seeking technology, investment and expertise from alternative suppliers. In an increasingly competitive international environment, the question facing Washington is therefore not whether Saudi Arabia will pursue nuclear development but how central a role the US will play in shaping that process.
The dilemma reflects a transformation of international politics. For much of the post-Cold War era, the United States could assume that its partners had few viable strategic alternatives. That assumption is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain.
China’s expanding economic presence across the Gulf, Russia’s continuing regional engagement and the growing diplomatic activism of middle powers have created a more competitive geopolitical environment. American leverage remains considerable, but it is no longer exclusive.
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Given these shifts, the use of conditionality deserves careful reconsideration. Conditional diplomacy has long been an instrument of American foreign policy. It succeeded when the conditions demanded were seen as attainable and broadly compatible with the recipient state’s own calculations. It is considerably less effective when it requires governments to reverse publicly declared positions that they regard as central to their national interests or political legitimacy.
The humanitarian consequences of the Gaza conflict further complicate this picture. Across the Arab world, public opinion has become substantially more attentive to Palestinian suffering and sceptical of diplomatic initiatives perceived to sideline Palestinian political rights.
Regardless of how governments balance public opinion against strategic considerations, no serious assessment of regional diplomacy can ignore the political environment created by the conflict.
Normalisation on Saudi terms
None of this implies that normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel has become impossible. On the contrary, Saudi leaders have repeatedly signalled that they continue to envision normalisation within the framework of a comprehensive political settlement.
The sequencing, however, matters profoundly. Expecting Riyadh to normalise first while postponing meaningful movement towards Palestinian statehood reverses the logic that Saudi policymakers have consistently embraced.
For Washington, the lesson concerns the nature of influence in a more plural international order. Influence derives not merely from military power or economic leverage but from the ability to align strategic partnerships with the enduring interests of allies.
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Policies that ignore those interests may produce symbolic demonstrations of resolve, but they seldom produce durable diplomatic outcomes.
The United States has long benefited from a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia because both countries recognised areas of mutual interest despite significant political differences. Preserving that partnership in the 21st century will require the same strategic realism that sustained it in the 20th.
The challenge confronting US policymakers is not to maximise pressure but to maximise strategic advantage. In a Middle East that is interconnected, economically diversified and geopolitically competitive, those two goals are no longer synonymous.
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The United States and Saudi Arabia have maintained one of the Middle East’s most consequential strategic partnerships for more than eight decades. That relationship has survived wars, oil crises, terrorism and profound political change because it has generally rested on shared strategic interests rather than ideological conformity.
A civilian nuclear agreement should be evaluated on its own merits: its contribution to energy security, technological cooperation, economic development and nuclear non-proliferation.
Tying it to an issue on which Saudi Arabia has consistently articulated a non-negotiable position risks sacrificing practical cooperation for unattainable political leverage.
Diplomacy succeeds when it recognises political realities rather than attempts to wish them away. The task facing Washington is not to compel Saudi Arabia to abandon its stated principles, but to create conditions in which regional peace and strategic cooperation are both achievable.
Conditioning one upon the immediate surrender of the other is unlikely to accomplish either objective.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.
